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December 2018 was a noisy month in Hungarian politics. Opposition MPs tried to
affect the fate of several bills in the parliamentary debate and then by obstruction.
The best known bill – nicknamed the slave law – aims to make manufacturing in
Hungary even more attractive for foreign direct investment by raising the number
of overtime hours employers could request to 400 p.a. (from 250) while delaying
payment for the extra time for up to 3 years. Once rules of order were used to
silence the opposition in Parliament, massive street protests amplified discontent
over the bill. 
Street protests of the scale and persistence are unusual in Hungary. In 2014
demonstrations against the planned internet tax made the Orbán government retreat,
but the protests of 2017-18 against the ousting of Central European University
made no impression. The demonstrations against the slave law did not affect its
passing in Parliament and signing by President Áder. Opposition MPs could not
even get across to have their 5 points read on public television: first they were
removed by building security by force and days later were finally told by an editor
that programming was a matter of editorial discretion in pubic broadcasting. The
most visible difference was in the style of policing the demonstrations: the display
of force by the sheer number of police deployed as well as the techniques used to
monitor and control protesters were unusual. 
The protests did not disrupt government operations. Prime Minister Orbán received
the US ambassador at a soccer game outside Budapest. This was an important
milestone for the new US ambassador who could not get across to Prime Minister
Orbán before concerning the fate of Central European University, a US-accredited
institution. With public attention focused on the slave law in the press and on
the streets, Parliament passed several bills of lasting constitutional significance,
including a comprehensive amendment to the 2011 law on churches and a new law
establishing administrative courts. 
The new law (Act no. CXXX of 2018) brings into existence a self-standing branch
of administrative courts, nominally within the Hungarian judiciary, yet, placed
under the direction of a separate, newly established Supreme Administrative Court
(Közigazgatási Fels#bíróság) alongside the existing Supreme Court (Kúria). The new
law puts into play the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law passed in June
2018, shortly after Hungarian voters returned Prime Minister Orbán’s FiDESz party
for a third consecutive term with 2/3 majority.
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The design and establishment of the new Hungarian administrative judiciary provides
insight into a new style of engineering illiberal constitutional democracy through
dialogue with European constitutional actors. It is not simply the case that Hungary
is undertaking judicial reform while the Article 7 TEU process is on its way. Rather,
a new phase of judicial reform is passed under European supervision despite the
clear threat it presents for the rule of law. It is too early to tell whether European
constitutional actors will take the bait, yet – if a recent decision of the European
Court of Human Rights is a sign to go by – the Orbán government may well succeed
in undermining the rule of law with the kind assistance of European constitutional
actors.  
*
Hungary’s administrative judiciary was abolished in 1949 with the Communist
takeover. Transition to democracy in 1989 and subsequent judicial reforms did not
restore administrative courts for pragmatic reasons (such as lack of resources and
qualified personnel). In 2011 when FIDESz embarked on its constitutional overhaul,
they focused on taking over the Constitutional Court and the existing judiciary, with
compromising judicial self-government, renaming the Supreme Court and forcing
judges into early retirement. The overhaul of the Hungarian ordinary judiciary did not
happen to the same degree as in Poland. The Venice Commission, the European
Commission, and the two European courts successfully intervened with shaping
the powers of the National Council of the Judiciary and also with the reshuffling of
personnel via early retirement. By 2018 it became part of the playbook to request the
opinion of the Venice Commission on judicial reform, except that the law was passed
before the Venice Commission could have a say on the bill.
The idea of establishing a separate wing of administrative courts was first floated in
2016 as part of the reform of public administration. At the time FIDESz did not have
2/3 majority in Parliament. When the government tried to establish administrative
courts via a simple statute, the Constitutional Court however invalidated the statute:
the Court agreed with President Áder that such a change would have required a
constitutional amendment (1/2017 (I. 17 AB decision)).
According to the official reasons supporting the bill on administrative courts, this is
a measure to give effect to the judgment of the Constitutional Court and to enforce
the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law. It is also a measure to restore a
feature of Hungary’s historic constitution and to align the Hungarian constitutional
regime with its European counterparts. According to the Hungarian government, the
model chosen was inspired by solutions in Austria and Bavaria where administrative
courts are placed under the direction of the ministry of justice, too. 
A careful reading of the law confirms that the noble pretext essentially enables the
packing of the Hungarian judiciary to the degree that the 2011 constitutional overhaul
could not achieve. The supreme court (Kúria) is sidelined through receiving a peer,
the Supreme Administrative Court. The ranks of administrative courts will be filled
in part from volunteers from the currently existing administrative and labor division
of the judiciary, and in part by new appointments. Transfers of judges serving in
administrative and labor divisions will not be automatic, but have to be requested:
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the first instance level of the new administrative judiciary is organized on the regional
level, while the existing courts sit one level below, on the county level. This means
that judges requesting transfers potentially face a major disruption of their private
and family lives.  
New appointments to the administrative bench can be selected from the ranks of
the judiciary as well as from various paths of the civil service. Although the selection
process includes a competition managed by the judiciary, the final decision is taken
by the Minister of Justice. The Minister may alter the ranking of candidates. Still, the
minister’s power over the staffing of the new courts is moderate compared to his
powers over finances and case management. 
The jurisdiction of this new wing of the judiciary, staffed by formed civil servants
handpicked by the Minister of Justice will have jurisdiction over a wide range
of cases, including – most likely – election disputes. A separate bill passed in
December 2018 (Act no. CXXXI of 2018) made meticulous transitional arrangements
for the new administrative courts to open on January 1, 2020. 
*
The ministerial supervision of the new administrative courts is not a hidden quality of
the new regime, it is a stated feature of the institutional design chosen after careful
comparative analysis. That judicial careers can be upset on such short notice is
certainly bad news for fans of the rule of law. It is all the more surprising that the
European Court of Human Rights saw no problem with an early retirement scheme
introduced by the Hungarian government for the judiciary and the prosecution
in 2013. In December 2018, in J.B. and others v. Hungary the ECtHR found the
complaints of such judges and prosecutors inadmissible, because the applicants
failed to establish with proper precision the severity of the impact this legislative
measure had on their private life protected under Article 8. The test used by the
ECtHR to establish the impact of an interference with one’s professional life as an
aspect of private life was established in September 2018 in Denisov v. Ukraine. 
It is striking that in J.B. and others the ECtHR was looking to ascertain the
individualized impact of a large-scale judicial reform on the professional lives of
judges forced into early retirement by law [§ 132]. In doing so the ECtHR did not
address the applicants’ contention that legal rules prescribing their early retirement
constituted “a serious attack against the independence of the Hungarian judiciary
as a whole.” [§. 113] Instead, the Court repeated several times that the current
regulation of judicial and prosecutorial retirement was shaped in the course of a
dialogue with the Constitutional Court, the Venice Commission, the CJEU and the
European Commission. The act of parliament passed in 2013 as a result of this
dialogue has provisions on compensation as well as transitional provision, adhering
to requirements of legal certainty. This approach is a clear departure from the
deeply contextualized approach followed by the ECtHR a few years earlier, when it
assessed the firing of Chief Justice Baka through constitutional and legal reform.
The freshly passed Hungarian law on administrative courts signals to Hungarian
judges that they are disposable and interchangeable with civil servants. The ones
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who get to stay do so at the grace of the political discretion of parliament (always
on the path to improve the functioning of the judiciary through reforms) and – in the
case of the new administrative courts – the Minister of Justice. Bad as this sounds,
to the extent the reform is carried out in dialogue with European constitutional actors,
it appears to be shielded from criticism by a strong presumption of compatibility with
the rule of law and human rights. This is cause for concern at a time when potential
challengers of the judicial reform (the parliamentary opposition, judges, human rights
defenders and scholars among them) face existential threats, executed through legal
rule passed by Parliament and dutifully printed in the Hungarian Official Journal.
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